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ABSTRACT: According to the ‘mating intelligence’ theory by evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller, 
human morality is a system of sexually selected traits which serve as costly signals to the other sex 
about one’s fitness and readiness to take care for possible offspring. Starting from the standard 
prediction of evolutionary psychology that sexual selection produces psychological sex differences in 
human mating strategies, ‘mating intelligence’ theory is analyzed for its compatibility with several 
psychological theories about sex differences in moral traits like moral reasoning, judgment and 
orientation. It is argued that the ‘mating intelligence’ theory, as a theory about the the evolution of 
morality, comes too dangerously close to being unfalsifiable because it embodies some auxiliary 
hypotheses and vague definitions which make it practically immune to every possible empirical finding 
concerning sex differences in human moral traits. 
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From Charles Darwin to the present day, various biological mechanisms have been 
proposed as crucial for the explanation of the evolution of human moral traits: group 
selection (Darwin 2004 [1871]), kin selection (Hamilton 1964), reciprocal altruism 
(Trivers 1971), multilevel selection (Sober and Wilson 1998), among others. All these 
proposals, along with their methodological merits and shortcomings, received 
significant attention from contemporary evolutionary ethicists and philosophers of 
biology. However, one Darwinian account of evolution of morality – probably 
because it is a relatively new player in the field – hasn’t been discussed too 
extensively so far. It is the ‘mating intelligence’ theory of the evolution of morality, 
proposed by evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller (2000, 2007, 2008a). 
Central to Miller’s ‘mating intelligence’ view of the evolution of morality is 
the theory of sexual selection. According to this theory (first proposed by Darwin in 
his Descent of Man), certain disadvantageous traits of organisms that cannot be 
explained by natural selection can be explained by sexual selection. Sexual selection 
takes place in two basic forms: as intrasexual selection or ‘male-male’ competition – 
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when members of one sex (usually males) compete with each other for access to 
mates – and as intersexual selection or ‘mate-choice’ – when members of one sex 
(usually females) choose to mate only with some individuals of the other sex on the 
basis of their ‘attractive’ and heritable traits. Although theory of sexual selection was 
either ignored or criticized by the majority of the most prominent evolutionists after 
Darwin, it regained its vigor during the final quarter of the 20th century (see Cronin 
1994, Spencer and Masters 1994). 
Contrary to the majority of other Darwinian theories of evolution of morality, 
Miller claims that human moral traits should be explained as products of sexual 
selection. Since moral traits seem too costly to be explained by natural selection, too 
irrational to be explained by reciprocal altruism, and too wide in scope to be explained 
by either kin or group selection, Miller believes that we should view morality as 
product of sexual selection or, as he says, as ‘a system of sexually selected 
handicaps’. Namely, moral traits (or moral virtues) like generosity, kindness and 
fidelity can be advantageous from the perspective of sexual selection, because they 
seem to be ‘sexually attractive, and may serve as mental fitness indicators: they are 
judged as reliably revealing good mental health, brain efficiency, genetic quality, and 
capacity for sustaining cooperative sexual relationships as well as investing in 
children.’ Miller thus came to believe that ‘sexual selection shaped some of our 
distinctively human moral virtues as reliable fitness indicators’ (2007, 98) and that we 
‘have the capacity for moral behavior and moral judgments today because our 
ancestors favored sexual partners who were kind, generous, helpful, and fair’ (2000, 
292). 
It is hard not to compare Miller’s view of human moral traits with the most 
cited example of sexual selection at work: the peacock’s tail. Peacock’s large and 
brightly colored tail, namely, may be a handicap to hiding or running and is as such 
disadvantageous or maladaptive from the perspective of natural selection. It has 
evolved, however, because it served as an ‘advertisement’ or ‘costly signal’ to 
peahens that its owner can afford and maintain such an energetically demanding and 
life endangering luxury, which obviously makes him a desirable sexual partner and 
father to one’s offspring. Human moral traits, according to Miller, are rough 
analogues to peacock’s tail. Although disadvantageous from the perspective of natural 
selection, they are advantageous from the perspective of sexual selection; they 
evolved as ‘advertisements’, ‘expensive ornaments’ or ‘costly signals’ to the other 
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sex, suggesting that the particular individual is likely to be healthy, strong, and 
faithful sexual partner and devote parent to possible offspring. 
Miller takes care to connect his theoretical proposals with as much as 
empirical data as possible, he announces a series of empirical predictions based on his 
theory, he promises to close some gaps in earlier Darwinian theories of morality, and 
even hopes to change the landscape of contemporary ethics by providing Darwinian 
support for the view of morality typical of the Aristotelian virtue theory (see esp. 
Miller 2007). Nevertheless, despite its actual and potential merits, his theory of 
evolution of morality seems open to certain objections revolving around the idea of 
empirical falsifiability. What follows is a critical reading of some Miller’s points 
about sex differences and the nature of human moral traits. I will try to show that his 
‘mating intelligence’ theory of evolution of moral traits remains too flexible and too 
immune to various mutually contradictory empirical findings from various branches 
of psychology. I am not suggesting that ‘mating intelligence’ theory has no virtues at 
all; all I would like to show is that, as an explanation of morality, it has some serious 
methodological and conceptual flaws. 
Sexual selection tends to produce both physical and psychological sex 
differences and it is usually invoked when such differences need to be explained. The 
standard prediction of evolutionary psychology that ‘sexes will differ in precisely 
those domains in which women and men have faced different sorts of adaptive 
problems’ (Buss 1995, 164) seems reasonably well substantiated by studies showing 
that men and women do differ significantly with respect to their mate preferences 
(Buss 1989; see also Mealey 2000). As David Buss argues, ‘[g]iven the power of 
sexual selection, under which each sex competes for access to desirable mates of the 
other sex, it would be astonishing to find that men and women were psychologically 
identical in aspects of mating about which they have faced different problems of 
reproduction for millions of years’ (2003, 211). Geoffrey Miller subscribes to the very 
same prediction and emphasizes: ‘If evolution shaped psychological sex differences 
anywhere in the human mind, we should expect them most prominently in MI [mating 
intelligence] abilities, since MI is most closely associated with reproduction, and sex 
differences arise most prominently in reproductive strategies’ (2008b, 379). 
 Apparently, Miller claims (a) that morality is the integral part of our ‘mating 
intelligence’ and (b) that psychological sex differences should be expected most 
prominently in the ‘mating intelligence’ (which is part of the larger body of 
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reproductive strategies). This claim allows for the following common sense corollary: 
if psychological sex differences can be expected most prominently in our ‘mating 
intelligence’, and if morality is the integral part of our ‘mating intelligence’, then sex 
differences may be expected just as prominently in our moral traits and abilities. 
Moreover, if the presence of significant sex differences in human mating psychology 
indicates that human mating psychology evolved by means of sexual selection, then 
the absence of sex differences in human moral psychology should be taken as 
indicating that sexual selection had no influence on its evolution. 
Before further analysis of the above corollary, it should be noted that the 
question of sex differences in moral traits and abilities (especially moral reasoning 
and judgment) is hardly new in moral and developmental psychology. Moreover, it is 
a question with a long and controversial tradition and what follows is a brief look at it. 
In the late 1960s Lawrence Kohlberg proposed his theory of moral 
development and reasoning, claiming that moral development is a cognitive process 
consisting of six progressive stages. On the face of it, Kohlberg’s tests and studies 
suggested male moral superiority because, on average, most boys and men seemed to 
have reached fourth stage of moral development, whereas most girls and women 
seemed to have reached only third stage (Kohlberg 1981, 1984). However, Kohlberg 
did not interpret this difference as sex specific in the biological sense, but explained it 
in terms of different socialization experiences of men and women. For Kohlberg, men 
and women have the same moral nature and the same natural moral abilities. The best 
known criticism of Kohlberg came from Carol Gilligan (1982) who claimed that 
women scored lower on Kohlberg’s tests because those tests were male biased. 
According to Gilligan, his tests were formulated in terms of abstract principles, rules 
and justice and as such were unsuitable for the allegedly specific feminine moral 
orientation focused on personal approach, personal experience, nurturing and care. 
For Gilligan, important sex specific differences in moral orientation and moral 
reasoning do exist and, as she famously declared, women speak of moral matters ‘in a 
different voice’ than men. 
Prompted by Gilligan’s criticism of Kohlberg, Lawrence Walker (1984) 
performed the metaanalysis of earlier studies on sex differences in moral reasoning 
and claimed to have shown that sex differences in moral reasoning are actually non-
significant and that Gilligan’s criticism of Kohlberg was unfounded. Disputes 
continued when Diana Baumrind (1986) performed an analysis of Walker 
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metaanalysis (‘metametaanalysis’), claiming to have detected some flaws in it which 
cast doubt on its general conclusions. Contrary to Baumrind’s view that some sex 
differences in moral reasoning do exist after all, the prevailing opinion today seems to 
be that ‘the weight of current research does not support the idea that gender 
differences in moral reasoning or moral orientation exist’ (Brabeck and Satiani 2002, 
444). 
In more recent times, neuroscience and ethics merged into a discipline called 
‘neuroethics’, with researchers performing fMRI experiments on brains of people 
while they were dealing with specially designed moral dilemmas better known as 
‘Trolley Problems’ (see e.g. Greene et al. 2001). This search for neural mechanisms 
behind human moral judgment attracted a lot of attention and provoked serious 
discussion, but it revealed no significant sex differences (see e.g. Hauser et al. 2007). 
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning some psychological studies on sex 
differences in certain capacities that seem closely linked with the capacity for 
morality. For example, developmental psychologist David Geary argues that, 
probably thanks to sexual selection, women are better than men in social cognition 
and the Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e. in making inferences about the ‘intentions, 
beliefs, emotional states, and likely future behavior of other individuals’ (Geary 2002, 
35). Although social cognition and ToM, strictly speaking, are not moral capacities, 
they are important prerequisites for morality, and if sex differences exist in social 
cognition and ToM, it would make sense to expect some parallel differences in moral 
capacities like moral reasoning, judgment or orientation. 
Given this variety of psychological and philosophical answers to the question 
of sex differences in human moral traits, it is hard to say conclusively if there are any 
or how large or important are they. As it was already suggested, studies revealing 
certain sex differences in moral traits would fit nicely with the ‘mating intelligence’ 
view of morality. However, as we will see shortly, this is not necessarily so. 
Although psychologists and philosophers tend to split their ways when it 
comes to the question of sex differences in various human moral traits, we can – for 
the sake of argument – speculate about some ‘alternative empirical realities’ and see 
how they might be related to the ‘mating intelligence’ theory of morality. Imagine two 
possible worlds: in possible world 1, significant sex differences in moral reasoning, 
judgment and orientation are discovered and confirmed, whereas in possible world 2 it 
is established with certainty that there are no sex differences in those traits 
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whatsoever. Which world would be a more welcoming place for the ‘mating 
intelligence’ theory of morality? 
In possible world 1, the world in which sex differences in moral reasoning and 
orientation do exist, these differences could be interpreted more or less 
straightforwardly as confirming the ‘mating intelligence’ theory. Sex differences 
would most likely square well with the standard prediction of evolutionary 
psychology according to which sexual selection produces not only physical, but also 
psychological sex differences. Moreover, if it turns out that some moral traits are 
better developed or more fine-tuned in women than in men (perhaps quasi-moral traits 
like ToM or social cognition as suggested by Geary), this would fit even better with 
the basic logic of the ‘mating intelligence’ theory. How this explanation could work is 
illustrated by Miller’s explanation of another set of alleged sex differences: sex 
differences in verbal ability and language comprehension. On one hand, as Miller 
concedes, ‘when sex differences do show up in human mental abilities, women 
typically show higher average verbal ability’; women, namely, ‘comprehend more 
words on average, and this sex difference accounts for almost 5 percent of the 
individual variation in vocabulary size (2000, 375). On the other hand, as Miller 
observes, ‘[m]en write more books. Men give more lectures. Men ask more questions 
after lectures. Men dominate mixed-sex committee discussions. Men post more e-mail 
to Internet discussion groups’ (2000, 376). 
Miller explains the above sex differences with his ‘male-display, female-
choice’ logic. In short, sex differences in verbal abilities and language comprehension 
reveal that language evolved under sexual selection because men used language as a 
display (courtship) device, whereas women developed more acute language 
comprehension as an evaluation device. Basically, the suggestion is that language had 
the same function as the peacock’s tail: ‘Normally, sexual selection makes males 
better display-producers and females better display-discriminators. Peacocks can grow 
bigger tails, but peahens may be better at seeing and judging tails’ (Miller 2000, 375). 
Apparently, the existence of sex differences is taken here as more or less direct 
confirmation of the hypothesis that human language evolved under sexual selection. 
Consequently, if we discover structurally similar sex differences in human moral traits 
and abilities – maybe with males as assertive moral-display producers and females as 
keen moral-display discriminators – ‘mating intelligence’ theory already has a 
convenient explanatory framework to account for them. 
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Consider now the possible world 2, the world with no sex differences in moral 
traits and abilities. Relying on the logic of the previous explanatory framework (the 
one applied on verbal abilities and language comprehension), one could argue that the 
absence of sex differences in the moral domain contradicts Miller’s ‘mating 
intelligence’ theory of evolution of morality. According to Miller, as we have seen, 
moral traits are part and parcel of our ‘mating intelligence’ and ‘mating intelligence’ 
shaped by sexual selection is the first place where sex differences are expected. 
However, if there are no sex differences in our moral traits, aren’t we obliged to 
symmetrical conclusion that moral traits are not part and parcel of our ‘mating 
intelligence’ and as such not shaped by sexual selection? 
Miller would probably disagree with the above objection and he does seem to 
have some ready-made replies to it. One possible strategy for dealing with such 
objections can be found in his account of general and creative intelligence. According 
to Miller, namely, human general and creative intelligence were also shaped by sexual 
selection although they show no significant sex differences. In order to reconcile this 
fact with his general theory and predictions concerning sex differences, Miller 
explains the absence of sex differences in general and creative intelligence with the 
following three auxiliary hypotheses, or three factors ‘that could have kept male 
human minds similar to female human minds despite strong sexual selection’ (see 
Miller 2000, 89–97): 
 
(1) Sex differences are leveled out to some extent as they are equally inherited by 
both male and female offspring. In a nutshell, both daughters and sons can 
inherit sexually selected traits from their fathers, just as they can inherit 
sexually selected traits from their mothers. 
(2) Evolution of the mental capacity for producing sexually attractive behavior 
causes parallel evolution of the mental capacity for assessing that behavior. 
The point is that in order to asses certain sexually attractive traits in other sex 
one already has to have those traits; for example, in order to assess someone’s 
intelligence or sense of humor, one already has to be intelligent or have sense 
of humor. 
(3) Mental capacities for sexual choice evolved equally in men and women 
because, when looking for long-term partners, both sexes had to be choosy and 
to display their attractiveness and intelligence. Namely, although men and 
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women do differ significantly in their preferences when it comes to short-term 
mating, they nevertheless seem to prefer practically the same traits in the other 
sex when it comes to long-term mating. 
 
It is not my intention to assess the plausibility of the above auxiliary hypotheses. The 
only point I wish to make here is that the very same auxiliary hypotheses which 
provide convenient framework for explaining similarity of male and female general 
and creative intelligence can also provide the convenient framework for explaining 
human moral traits as products of sexual selection. Namely, even if it turns out that 
there are absolutely no sex differences in moral traits like moral reasoning, judgment 
or orientation, proponent of the ‘mating intelligence’ theory could still maintain that 
moral traits were sexually selected by employing some of these auxiliary hypothesis, 
i.e. by arguing that sex differences in moral traits were leveled out by some of the 
factors that leveled out sex differences in general and creative intelligence. To 
anticipate some of my concluding points, it seems that auxiliary hypotheses are 
invoked when counter-evidence needs to be reconciled with the general theory (as in 
the possible world 1), but not when they could complicate the nice match between the 
theory and other empirical observations (as in the possible world 2). 
Even if the above auxiliary hypotheses can explain the absence of sex 
differences in general intelligence, it does not follow that they are sufficient to 
explain the alleged absence of sex differences in traits like moral judgment or moral 
reasoning. It is implausible to assume without further explanation, namely, that moral 
reasoning is just a special case or application of general intelligence. For example, 
according to influential social-intuitionist theory, ‘moral judgment is more a matter of 
emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning’ (Greene and Haidt 2002, 
517; see also Haidt 2001). Views like these present special challenge to the ‘mating 
intelligence’ account of morality. Namely, if human moral reasoning is mediated by 
‘emotion and affective intuition’ (as social-intuitionists claim), and if emotional 
mechanisms behind human mate preferences are significantly sexually differentiated 
(as evolutionary psychologists claim), why are there no traces of similar sexual 
differentiation in moral traits like moral reasoning or judgment? It is strange that 
Miller, on one hand, very freely interprets a series of highly distinct traits as moral 
traits or moral virtues (cognitive traits like ‘intelligence’, emotional traits like 
‘sympathy’, even physical traits like ‘beauty’), but on the other hand does not address 
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theoretically important questions about the exact nature of and possible sex 
differences in moral reasoning or judgment. As we have seen, these questions are 
extensively discussed by both philosophers and psychologists and it is surprising that 
they do not appear in an ambitious evolutionary account of human morality like 
Miller’s ‘mating intelligence’ theory. 
What I basically wanted to emphasize in this article is that Miller’s application 
of auxiliary hypotheses appears too arbitrary and that his ‘mating intelligence’ theory 
relies on two very different explanatory frameworks: one for mental traits with sex 
differences (traits like verbal abilities and language comprehension) and another one 
for mental traits without sex differences (traits like general and creative intelligence). 
When it comes to sexually differentiated traits, they are accepted as confirmations of 
the general theory (‘male display, female choice’). When it comes to sexually 
undifferentiated traits, auxiliary hypotheses are introduced in order to reconcile this 
fact with the general theory. What remains unclear, however, is the contextual and 
apparently asymmetric logic behind the application of auxiliary hypotheses. Namely, 
if there are factors that kept ‘male human minds similar to female human minds 
despite strong sexual selection’, why did they level out sex differences in some, but 
not in other mental traits and abilities? 
Does all of this mean that the ‘mating intelligence’ theory of morality is 
unfalsifiable? The charge of unfalsifiability, especially in its classical form (Popper 
2002 [1935]) may sound obsolete and out of place. Namely, Miller is himself well-
aware of the fact that sexual selection ‘can potentially explain any aspect of human 
nature that scientists can notice’ (2000, 11) and he readily admits that his ‘sexual 
choice theory sometimes sounds as if it could explain anything, and hence explains 
nothing’ (2000, 27). However, confession does not turn vices into virtues. Miller is 
much less humble, for example, when he announces that his theory can actually 
explain ‘most of the things that human minds are uniquely good at, such as humor, 
story-telling, gossip, art, music, self-consciousness, ornate language, imaginative 
ideologies, religion, and morality’ (2000, 18) or when he almost prophetically predicts 
that ‘genetic evidence that will emerge in the coming years will probably render [his] 
ideas – even the apparently most speculative ones – fully testable in ways [he] cannot 
anticipate’ (2000, 27). 
Although the charge of unfalsifiability directed against certain claims of 
evolutionary psychology may be too generalized, overdemanding and replete with 
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negative bias (Sesardic 2003), that does not imply that there is no force to it. It is 
always possible to avoid falsification of a theory by introducing certain auxiliary 
hypotheses and by using certain vague or ad hoc definitions. If these strategies of 
avoiding falsification are methodological vices, then the ‘mating intelligence’ theory, 
when applied to the evolution of morality, appears sinful in at least two ways. Firstly, 
as I have tried to show, the theory seems too adjustable to two contradictory 
observational results (to sex differences in moral traits both existing and not existing), 
and too compatible with too many different theories (with theories that do postulate 
significant sex differences in human moral traits and with those that don’t). And 
secondly, the theory utilizes auxiliary hypotheses which, if necessary, could help 
explain possible absence of sex differences in human moral traits, but at the price of 
the questionable or at least unsubstantiated assumption that moral reasoning is no 
different from the general intelligence. 
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